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In this paper we take a step towards bringing the analysis of optimal tax policy under imperfect competition to the same footing as that under competitive markets. We address optimal tax policy in a non-competitive labor market using a mechanism design approach. We modify Mirrlees' (1971) canonical model to accommodate the presence of market power. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to the utility cost 1 A noteworthy recent exception is Cahuc and Laroque (2014) .
of producing any given amount of output and this is private information. Each firm is randomly matched with workers whose productivities are private information. The firm offers screening contract to workers. This protocol under which firms move first making take it or leave it offers generates substantial market power to firms. With market power by firms is that earnings need not be equal to the output an worker produces. Another layer of informational asymmetry between workers and the government is introduced since the latter can only observe earnings.
3 This raises new issues as government goal is to design tax policies which are optimally used as screening instruments for a firm which itself is trying to screen a worker who has private information on his productivity. Therefore the usual approach used in the screening literature -e.g. Mirrlees (1971) and Baron and Myerson (1982) -does not apply.
To circumvent this difficulty we develop a new approach based on a duality between the planner's and the firm's Euler equation. It is valid under the assumption that the taxation principle applies in our setting, i.e., that all that may be implemented via mechanisms may also be implemented through budget sets and viceversa. 4 Indeed, by transforming both the firm's and the planner's programs into calculus of variation problems we are able to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation via taxes. We then characterize optimal tax schedules for which the necessary conditions for implementation are satisfied.
Tax schedules must naturally be based on variables that are observed by the Government. This requirement is satisfied by tax systems comprised of labor income tax schedules, taxes on firms' profits, and transfers to unemployed workers in the form of unemployment benefits. We show that for an allocation which maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function to be induced by a tax schedule, marginal tax rates must be negative for all but the workers at the top of the distribution. Such schedule must be supplemented by a cash transfer for any worker who does not work, and by a tax on the firm's profits. 5 To understand the rationale for marginal earnings subsidies, start from the optimal utilitarian allocation. Then, consider the impact of reducing labor supply of a worker with the highest possible disutility of effort. To keep this agent's utility constant, this must be accompanied by lower earnings for the worker. Such a reform makes the bundle less attractive for all workers with lower disutility of effort, i.e., it lowers their utility if they deviate and choose this bundle. Such a reform is attractive to the firm since the utilitarian allocations leaves too much rent in the hands of all workers from the firm's perspective. To implement this allocation the firm must distort effort downwards. Finally, to counter the distortion introduced by the firm the planner imposes a negative marginal tax rate on workers' earnings. Although we have focused on the worker with the highest disutility of effort, the same is true for all other workers with the proviso that the reform must also take into account incentive effects for workers with higher disutility of effort.
The characterization results mentioned above are based on the necessary conditions for implementation. It is not always the case that an allocations that solves the planner's utilitarian program can be implemented when labor markets are not competitive. Indeed, we offer an example of a Pareto efficient allocation for which the necessary conditions for implementation fail to hold.
When, however, the sufficient conditions are also satisfied it is possible to show that tax schedules are progressive. Marginal tax rates are non-positive but increasing in earnings.
We then generalize the results above by considering different Pareto weights for the planner's program. More precisely, we consider a sequence of distribution of weights that keep increasing the relative weights of the most disadvantaged workers. Strictly negative marginal tax rates obtain for any worker for whom we there are (positive measure of) workers with lower disutility of effort and strictly positive Pareto weights. We show that as the planner's metric approaches a Rawlsian limit the sufficient conditions for implementation are eventually satisfied. For every agent, the marginal tax rates becomes arbitrarily close to zero. In the limit case for which the planner wants to implement a Rawlsian allocation, marginal tax rates are zero for all workers and the optimal policy is comprised of a transfer to the unemployed financed by taxes on profits.
Thus far, we have assumed that all that can be implemented through game forms can also be implemented via budget sets. But is this the case? As we have mentioned, firms have in practice, monopsonistic power over the workers they hire. In this sense, any implementation that is possible under the market structure we examine is also feasible under a monopsony. The converse is not true, however. We show that monopsonist markets pose no impediments to constrained efficiency if the planner has access to very rich information about the firm's payroll. Any (constrained) efficient allocation may be implemented by harshly punishing the firm if it does not generate the distribution of earnings that is associated with the desired allocation. Note that such mechanism requires the planner to use the information on all the distribution of earnings and the fact that all workers in the economy work for the same firm. Such a mechanism is, therefore, quite sensitive to the details of the environment and therefore unlikely to be useful for police prescriptions.
The market structure we consider is the polar opposite view from the competitive paradigm used in the literature. By focusing on this benchmark case, we could enhance our comprehension of the interaction between imperfect competition in the labor market and optimal redistributive policies. Accordingly, several economic forces identified by our model are likely to emerge in models characterized by some, even if not monopsonistic, power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 1 describes the environment. Section 2 is where we describe the nature of the problem we study. Section 2.1 describes the program which defines the allocation that the planner wishes to implement. In Section 2.2 we show the problem faced by firms when given the tax schedule imposed by the Government. The main results of the paper are in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend the planner's objective beyond utilitarianism. We discuss alternative mechanisms for which the direct reliance on crossing information between workers and firms are crucial in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Very technical derivations are relegated to appendices.
Environment
We consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of workers that differ from one another according to a single preference parameter θ, that defines the dis-utility of effort. Formally, workers have preferences defined over consumption, c ∈ R + , and effort, n ∈ R + , of the following form.
We assume that ν and η are smooth, satisfy ν , −ν , η > 0 and η ≥ 0. We normalize ν(0) and η(0) to 0. The parameter θ belongs to an interval θ,θ ⊂ R ++ and captures the disutility from working. Under separable iso-elastic preferences the model is isomorphic to Mirrlees' (1971) optimal tax setting, where it is productivity that differs across workers. As in Mirrlees (1971) , we assume that θ is workers' private information.
The distribution of types, F (·), which is common knowledge has an associated smooth density f (·).
Thus far our model is exactly Mirrlees's (1971) specialized to separable preferences. We now depart from the competitive assumption that underlies Mirrlees' (1971) and, for that matter, almost all the optimal tax literature. We consider a continuum of workers and firms, in which each firm is randomly matched with a finite number or workers and every worker is matched with a single firm.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, the government sets a lump-sum tax on all firms which decide to participate in the market. Upon agreeing to participate, the firm is randomly matched with workers each of whom has private information about its productivity. Then the firm offers a screening contract to workers with whom it is matched.
Firms' ownership is spread uniformly across workers in such a way that no worker wishes the firm to deviate from profit maximizing behavior. A firm operates as long as its expected profits are non-negative. It is apparent that our model is isomorphic to one for which a single firm operates in the market. We discuss this alternative modelling assumption in Section 4.
In Mirrlees' (1971) formulation of the problem, the source of informational asymmetry between the planner and the workers is the fact that effort is not observed by the planner, only output. Because the latter is the product of a worker's productivity, which is only privately observed, and his effort, the observation of output does not allow the planner to disentangle the former from the latter. That is, output is observed but the utility cost of producing such output is not observed. Here, the planner observes neither workers' effort nor the output generated by such effort. All it observes are the earnings of each worker. It must therefore base policy on earnings, which need not coincide with output in this non-competitive setting.
For our purposes it will be convenient to define the inverse functions φ = η −1
and κ = ν −1 , and work directly with the variables h and u defined by ν(κ(u)) = u and η(φ(h)) = h.
Setting Up the Stage

The Mirrlees' (1971) Program
Assume that the planner could observe workers' outputs. The planner would then choose an allocation that solved the Utilitarian program -henceforth, Program P,
subject to,
We make assumptions about the nature of the Mirrlees' (1971) program's solution. That is, we focus on problems which primitives lead to well behaved solutions for program P that display no exclusion and no bunching. For simplicity, we also restrict our analysis to cases for which the solution is characterized by smooth consumption and labor-supply profiles. (ii)v * is strictly increasing.
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For any incentive-compatible and differentiable profile of indirect utilities, (v (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , the amount of labor supplied by type θ, h(θ), satisfiesv (θ) = −h(θ) and his flow utility from consumption is recovered from
Our analysis is based on the relationship between the planner's and the firm's problem. We review here the some basic properties of P's solution. Under Assumption 1, the planner's program can be written by adding a multiplier, λ, to the isoperimetric constraint (5) -see Theorem 14.21 in Clarke (2013) . We may therefore write P, as
6 In Section 4 we consider alternative Paretian objectives for the planner. 7 We use a dot over a function to denote its derivative with respect to θ, e.g.
Integrating both sides of (6) and using the fact that the allocation of the most efficient type, θ, is not distorted,
In all that follows (h * (θ) , u * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] will denote the allocation associated with
Is it possible to implement (v * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , in our setting? I.e., is there a tax system that induces the planner's allocation as an equilibrium for our economy? It will soon be clear that a policy comprised of a single labor income tax schedule will fail in general to implement the planner's allocation. The reason is twofold. First, the firm will always set the utility of the least productive type that it hires as low as possible -lemma 1, below. Therefore, to guarantee that the lowest type that is hired by the firm obtains utility v * (θ) the government will have to pay unemployment benefits, b, which deliver utility ν(b) = v * (θ) for anyone who is not working. Second, because the policy entails transfers to workers that increase firms' profits, the planner will use taxes on profits to balance the budget. However, to rule out a trivial implementation in which the government tax 100% of firms' profits and makes firms indifferent between all allocations, we consider taxes such that net profits are strictly increasing in gross profits, albeit arbitrarily close to 100%.
The Firm's (relaxed) Program
Assume that the planner has imposed an earnings tax schedule, T (·), i.e., a mapping from earnings into tax obligations.
We define χ(·) as the function that maps the flow utility from consumption that the firm delivers to the worker to total earnings that the worker needs in order to attain this level of flow utility. Provided that χ is a monotonic function it is related to T through ν(χ(u) − T (χ(u))) = u. To account for possible non-monotonicity of χ we shall refer to the taxes paid by an agent with flow utility of consumption u as the value defined through χ(u) − T (u) = κ(u) ∀u ∈ U.
Assume that χ : U :→ R is continuously differentiable over this domain. This will allow us to use standard optimal control methods.
Each worker's consumption is then his earnings minus the taxes he must pay. Let u(θ) be the flow utility from consumption that a type θ worker obtains and U, the set of flow utilities from consumption that the firm at which he works can deliver. 8 We let U := [u 1 , u 2 ] be a compact interval of R ++ containing u * (θ), u * (θ) . To simplify the analysis below we assume that u 1 < u * (θ) and u 2 > u * (θ). Simplicity stems from the fact that under this assumption the flow utility from consumption, u(θ), of any worker, θ, is an interior point of U along the Mirrlees's (1971) solution profile, (u * (θ)) θ∈Θ . Beyond simplicity, this assumption guarantees that the implementation we consider does not hinge upon any discontinuity of the tax schedule around the desired allocation.
The firms' relaxed program (Program P F ) is then
where θ 0 ≤θ is the highest type potentially hired by the firm and v 0 is the utility that workers obtain if they are not working. Note that we have not imposed the monotonicity constraint (4) in Program P F 's definition. The first thing we note is that, if a solution to Program P F exists, then it leaves no rent to the least efficient type that is hired -lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If a solution to the firm's relaxed program exists then it delivers utility v 0 to the least efficient type that is hired.
Proof. Let v be a solution to the firm's problem and letθ be the highest type hired. Assume towards a contradiction that v(θ) > v 0 . Incentive compatibility implies that θ =θ. Let, then, {h, u} be the functions associated with v. Take ε > 0 such that
Notice that the new allocation ȟ ,ǔ defined byȟ (θ) := h(θ) + ε for all θ anď u (θ) := u(θ) for all θ ≤θ is implementable and yields a strictly higher profit for the firm. A contradiction.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If v solves the firm's problem and the highest type that is hired obtains a positive rent, then the firm can implement a new allocation in which all hired types have the same consumption level, but all of them supply more labor.
Assume that the tax policy is such that the firm chooses to hire any type, i.e., θ 0 =θ.
9 Then, using the same arguments used in Section 2.1, we can write Program P F as the following calculus of variation problem,θ
Implementing the Mirrlees' (1971) allocation
Assume that a function χ(·) exists for which the firms' program P F exists and coincides with the Mirrlees ' (1971) 
In Section 3.1 we characterize such a function, assuming that it exists. In Section 3.2 we show conditions under which it does exist. In particular, we derive sufficient conditions which depend only on the properties of the distribution of types. We also allow for bunching in Section 3.3.
Characterizing Optimal Tax Systems
If the utility profile, (v * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , that solves the Mirrlees' (1971) also solves the firm's relaxes program P 1 , then it must satisfy the Euler equation,
Since u * (θ) < u 2 , standard arguments imply that the most efficient worker is not
Since there is no distortion in the solution of the planner's problem, κ (v
, we conclude that the most efficient worker faces zero marginal tax rates:
We have reached these conclusions ignoring the monotonicity constraints in the firm's program, P F . Recall, however, that we have assumed that the solution for the Mirrlees' (1971) program, P, is monotonic. Hence these constraints do not bind in the sense that a small perturbation of the Mirrlees' (1971) 
satisfies them. The Euler equation (8) and the transversality condition,
must therefore be satisfied.
Lemma 2. If χ(·) implements the Mirrlees' (1971) solution, v * (θ), then (9) holds at the solution to the firm's problem and the marginal income tax on the most efficient worker is zero.
To further characterize the the structure of a tax system which implements the allocation (v * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] we evaluate (9) and (7) at the Mirrlees' (1971) allocation and ask which properties χ must possess to induce v * . This procedure along with Lemma 2 yield the following proposition. Mirrlees' (1971) 
Proposition 1. If χ(·) implements the
I.e., marginal tax rates are negative for all workers θ > θ.
Proof. We combine the planner and the firm's Euler equations by subtracting (9) from (7), to obtain
Let us define
and re-write (10) as
Differentiating (11) with respect to θ and multiplying by θ we get
Integrating this expression, yields
Since we have no distortion at the bottom for both the planner's and the firm's problem, we have ρ(θ) = 0. We may then write
Recall now that
We say that a tax system involves marginal incentives to consumption if the consumer is being subsidized at the margin: χ (u) < κ (u).
When the firm contemplates increasing the labor supply of some type θ, it tradesoff the efficiency gains from this policy with the losses associated with leaving larger information rents to every typeθ < θ, which the firm does not value. The government, on the other hand, benefits directly from the additional rent left to types θ < θ, since it places positive weight on welfare of all workers. Thus, to align the firm's interests with its own interests the planner must lower the marginal cost of increasing labor supply of type θ. This is done by introducing a negative marginal tax rate.
The firm may also choose to exclude some types. This choice becomes very tempting when the firm makes small profits from workers with high disutilily of effort. Indeed, if the firm is not making profits with a worker it benefits from excluding him and increasing rents extracted from more efficient types. The firm would never, then, hire a worker and not make strictly positive profits on him. To guarantee that the firm hires all workers the planner must make sure that this is the case by subsidizing them, the intended allocation entails a level of consumption for the worker that exceeds his output.
Proposition 2. Assume that the Mirrlees' (1971) allocation is such that the least efficient worker,θ, consumes no less than his output. Then a subsidy not inferior to
must be given to all workers.
Wedges and Taxes
We have seen that marginal tax rates are always negative at the Mirrlees' (1971) allocation. This is in sharp contrast with Seade's (1977) findings regarding marginal tax rates in the Mirrlees ' (1971) program, despite the fact that the same allocation is implemented.
To understand the difference, note that there are two layers of distortions which are imposed on each worker: one by the firm and the other by the planner. Wedges defined as the difference between the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and effort are not, in general, equal to marginal tax rates. Indeed, let τ (θ) denote the wedge faced by a type θ worker at the induced allocation. Then, by definition,
Next, let us consider the case in which
Thus the tax τ is obtained by: χ(u) = κ(u) + τ (χ (u)). Of course, wedges and taxes are related. If z(n) is the earnings function, mapping a workers' output, n, to his earnings, z, then, with some abuse in notation, c(n) = z(n) − T (z(n)). This allows us to write τ = (1 − T ) z . The earnings function, z(n), is such that
for all θ. Figure 1 displays marginal taxes, T , and wedges, τ , for example 3.2, below. This is all based on the assumption that χ is strictly increasing in u along the whole interval [u * (θ), u * (θ)]. We cannot however rule out the possibility that χ is decreasing in some interval, in which case the firm receives a transfer from the Government that exceeds the payment made to the worker. Due to the convexity of χ, we may find θ a such that for all agents in the interval [θ, θ a ] a firm pays no more than what it pays toθ yet agents in this interval have higher earnings (and produce more).
Finally note that taxes, defined as the difference between earnings, z, and consumption, c, may differ from the total surplus generated by the worker, n − c, in this non-competitive environment . Indeed taxes are the sum of total surplus generated by the worker and the net profit the firm makes with the worker, z − n.
We can therefore read Proposition 3 as stating that whenever the desired allocation entails a negative surplus by the least efficient agent, the planner must offer a subsidy, z − n < 0, to all workers.
Implementability
Is it always possible to implement the planner's solution? Assume for the moment that the firm chooses to exclude no type. In this case, if the firm's program is concave in (v,v) If χ induces the firm to hire all types then program P F is equivalent to the calculus of variation problem above, which has a solution if it is concave inv. In Proposition 3 we derive subsidies that guarantee that the firm will hire all types at the solution for the Mirrlees' (1971) Program. 10 Differentiating (13) with respect to θ we get
whereu
Under (15) we can, in this case, construct a convex function χ(·) from (13) and the boundary condition φ (−v * (θ)) = θχ (v * (θ) − θv * (θ)). This guarantees that the firm's problem is concave and that, provided that there is no exclusion, the Mirrlees' (1971) allocation, (v * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , solves the firm's problem, P
F
The conditions above do not pin down, φ h * (θ) − χ(u * (θ)), hence the subsidy for the least efficient type, χ(u * (θ)) − κ(u * (θ)). Proposition 3, below, shows that we can construct a tax system in which the firm never excludes any type by offering to the least efficient worker,θ, a subsidy
where f := min θ f (θ).
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Proposition 3. Assume that (15) holds. Then, there is a tax system that implements the planner's problem. The mapping χ(·) must satisfy (13), the boundary condition
) and must give a subsidy (16) to the least efficient workerθ.
for arbitrarily small δ > 0, may be derived using a considerably lengthier calculation.
It is straightforward to check whether the distribution of talents in the economy satisfies condition (15), hence whether the sufficient conditions given by Proposition 3 are satisfied. In the example below we show that (15 ) is always satisfied under the uniform distribution.
Example 3.1. Assume that the distribution of types is uniform, θ ∼ U [θ,θ], then the term in curly brackets in the left hand side of (15) becomes
which is clearly increasing in θ. An allocation solving the Mirrlees' Utilitarian program, P, is therefore implementable. Moreover, in this case the marginal tax rate is increasing, i.e., it is optimal to have a 'progressive' tax schedule.
The term progressive here refers to increasing marginal tax rates. Because marginal tax rates are non-positive for all agents total subsidies must be higher for more productive agents. Marginal subsidies do however decrease with earnings.
Proposition 3 leaves open the possibility that utilitarian solutions to Mirrlees' (1971) programs are always implementable, i.e., that a taxation principle always applies. It turns out that a necessary condition for implementation is for the firm's problem to be concave inv (see Lemma 7). Differentiating twice the planner's problem with respect tov we obtain φ (−v
Using (13), we have
Hence, a necessary condition for the firm's problem to be concave inv is
This latter equation, (17), imposes a restriction on χ that depends on the local behavior of f , namely
This condition need not be always satisfied. Next, we can offer an example of an environment for which it is not possible to implement the planner's utilitarian solution using a tax system. Example 3.2. Let preferences be of the form
Then the Mirrlees's (1971) program becomes subject to (2), (3), (4), and (5).
A little bit of algebra allows us to write the program above simply as
which solution is given by the first order condition,
and the monotonicity restriction that the term in the right hand side of (18) be increasing in θ.
As for the implementability constraint, χ ≥ 0, in this example it becomes
increasing in θ. Although similar, the monotonicity and the implementability conditions differ. It is then possible to choose a function F (·) such that the left hand side of (18) is increasing in θ, for all θ, but (19) is decreasing in an interval [θ a , θ b ] ∈ Θ thus violating convexity of χ(·).
Bunching
Up to this point we have dealt with the case in which the solution for the Mirrlees' (1971) program is such that h(·) is a strictly decreasing function of θ.
It is possible to generalize our results by assuming that the monotonicity restriction binds in the Mirrlees (1971) program, i.e. that there is bunching. Bunching introduces new challenges and technical issues for the application of our method. In particular, note that we rely onu * < 0 in (14) to assess implementability in our setting, which clearly cannot be true for all θ once we have intervals of bunching in the solution to the planner's problem. Moreover, it was this assumption that allowed us to focus on a relaxed program for the firm.
To deal with this difficulty, we consider a sequence of problems in which, for every n, bunching is allowed neither in the planner's program [P n ] nor in the firm's program [P F n ]. Formally, we consider a sequence of problems in which −ḣ is restricted to a compact set [n −1 , n]. Under these restrictions, a suitable generalization of the method developed in the text applies. If we assume that (15) holds and, for each n, let (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] denote the solution to the planner's constrained problem P n , then we can construct a convex mapping χ n (·) that implements the solution (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] in the associated firm's problem P F n . As n increases, the requirement that −ḣ belongs to [n −1 , n].becomes less stringent and consequently the sequence of solutions (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] converges [a.e.] to (v * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , with the allocations converg-
We show that the sequence of functions χ n (·) is equicontinuous and hence contains a subsequence that converges uniformly to a Lipshitz function, χ(·). Finally, the convergence of (v *
used to assert that (v * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] solves the firm's program under χ(·). Indeed, were it note the case (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] would not solve the firm's problem P F n for n large enough. The whole argument is rather technical and we relegate it to appendix D. The main point is that our method works in this case as well.
Beyond Utilitarianism
In this section we generalize the objective of the planner. We focus on allocations that are associated with more redistributive metrics, in the sense of placing larger weights in more disadvantaged workers -higher θ.
We prove two results. First, we show that the more skewed the welfare weights are towards the less efficient workers, the easier it is for the associated sufficient condition for implementation to be satisfied. Second, as the planner's welfare metric approaches the Rawlsian limit the marginal tax rate faced by any type θ worker gets arbitrarily close to zero .
The allocations we investigate in this section solve a problem which differs from P by the fact that the planner attaches weights, ω(θ), with ω(θ) > 0 for each type θ worker. That is, we letˆθ
substitute for (5) in program P. We consider a sequence of Pareto problems that approach a Rawlsian limit in which only the utility of the worse of worker matters. Toward this end we construct a sequence of Programs,P n with associated weights ω n (θ) of the form ω n (θ) = A n θ n−1 , where A n is chosen in such a way as to guarantee that, for all n,´θ θ ω n (θ)f (θ)dθ = 1. Note that the relative weights ω n (θ)/ω n (θ) converge to 0 as n goes to infinity. An analogous derivation to the one used in Section 3.2, allows us to derive for Wedges, τ
Mg. Tax Rates, T
Marginal Earnings, z (n). each n the sufficient condition (15) for implementation,
For each n, let (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] be the solutionP n and (h * n (θ) , u * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , the associated optimal allocation. We assume that for all n, (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] satisfies Assumption 1. Additionally, we assume that the sequence of Lagrange multipliers, (λ n ) n , associated with the isoperimetric constraints, (20), for eachP n is uniformly bounded by some constant λ > 0. This conditions always holds, for instance, when labor supply belongs to a bounded set.
Next we show that when the Pareto weights are sufficiently biased towards the least talented workers, the planner's preferred allocations is always implementable by a tax system. Proposition 4. For all n, let the allocation that solves the Planner's program,P n , satisfy Assumption 1. Then, there is n * ∈ N such that for all n > n * the allocation is implementable.
Proof. For any n the sufficient condition for implementation is, in this case,
Then, it is not hard to see that (21) holds whenever
It follows that the last inequality always holds for
According to Proposition 4, (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] is implementable for large enough n. For each n let χ n (·) be a function which defines the firms' programs solved by (v * n (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] .
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Proposition below shows that as n increases χ n (u * n (θ)) gets arbitrarily close to κ (u * n (θ)) for all θ <θ. That is, as n increases andP n approaches the Rawlsian limit, marginal tax rates converge to zero for every type θ < θ.
Proposition 5. Assume that for all n the allocation which solves the planner's program,P n , satisfies Assumption 1. Then, for every
Because´θ θ ω n (θ)f (θ)dθ = 1, we must have
For n sufficiently large we may further simplify to A n ≤ 2nθ −n /f . Then, since λ n ≤λ we have
The intuition behind Propositions 4 and 5 is straightforward. As the planner's preferences approach the Rawlsian metric, it places less and less weight on types θ < θ. In the limit, its program becomes maximizing the economy's resources subject to giving a minimum utility to the least efficient worker. But this problem is equivalent to the firm's problem. Therefore incentives are aligned and marginal tax rates should be equal to zero. Figure 2 , displays the effect on wedges and taxes of increasing n.
Alternative Mechanisms
Our restriction to tax schedules or, more generally, tax systems borrows from the results in Hammond (1979 Hammond ( , 1987 that show the equivalence between mechanisms and tax systems in competitive markets -see Guesnerie (1998) . This equivalence fails, however, to hold in some environments when, for example, the anonymity assumption that underlies most implementations via tax schedules is relaxed, e.g., Piketty (1993) . In this section we ask whether we can implement more by assuming that the monopsonistic power is caused by the presence of a single firm in the market -5.1.
Next, back to our baseline rationale for market power, we show how crossing information of firms and workers and blurring the distinction between workers and firms by conditioning a worker's allocations on profits of the firm he works for may increase the set of implementable allocations -5.2.
Monopsony
Thus far we have exploited the similarity between each firm's program and that of a monopsonistic firm. That is, the expected profit maximization problem of each firm is formally equivalent to the profit maximization problem of a single monopsonistic firm. The question we address here is whether one can do more in the case of a true monopsony than in the economy we have been studying.
We first note that each agent's earnings are assumed to be observed by the planner. Otherwise, the planner would not be able to impose any tax schedule. Since there is only one firm in the economy, observing the distribution of earnings for the whole economy is the same as observing the distribution of payments made by the firm. Because earnings map one to one into consumption and because incentive compatibility requires monotonicity, the planner is able to recover the whole profile, (u (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] from the economy's distribution of earnings.
Consider then the following mechanism. For a worker who announces to be of type θ the planner offers an unemployment benefit that yields a utility v * θ if he does not work. To the firm, the planner suggests that it implements the consumption profile, c * (θ) = κ(u * (θ)), ∀θ, (u * (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] , the consumption profile corresponding to the Mirrlees' (1971) problem's solution. If it the firm does as suggested, the planner requires a transfer from (or makes a transfer to) the firm that leads to zero profits. If it does not, the planner demands a payment equal to ∞. Extreme punishment guarantees obedience. We prove next that in the unique best-response of the firm it chooses an allocation which is [a.e.] equal to the one induced by the planner's problem.
Proposition 6. A mechanism that uses information on the entire distribution of earnings implements the Mirrlees' (1971) allocation, if the planner is allowed to use strong punishment on the firm.
Proof. In any solution to the firm's problem (c (θ) , h(θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] the least efficient worker, θ must obtain zero rent, as we have seen. Hence, ν(c θ ) −θh(θ) = v * θ . Incentivecompatibility implies monotonicity which implies that the firm should give the lowest consumption toθ. If the firm implements the consumption profile suggested by the government, it must be the case that c(θ) = c * (θ), which further implies
where the Riemann-Stieltjes integrals above are well defined because both ν • c and h are monotonic.
Therefore, for almost all θ, we have
which is equal to h * (θ) −´θ θ dν(c(θ)). Since the firm chooses the same consumption distribution as the government, the latter term equals
for almost all θ.
The message we get from this section is that, if the planner can use information on the entire consumption profile and a policy which imposes strong punishment for a failure to deliver a desired profile, it may in practice implement any incentivefeasible allocation it desires. We reached this conclusion by treating the firm as if it were an agent endowed with a well defined objective. This deserves some qualifications, however, since the firm's objective must be ultimately derived from that of its owners. In particular, we said nothing about the firm's ownership structure in this setting and whether profit maximization should still be derived as its objective.
If we assume a diluted ownership as we have been assuming for the 'small' firms we have been considering so far, the fact that the firm has monopsonisitc power means that we can no longer guarantee that agents agree on profit maximization as its goal. Indeed, the set of rules under which decision is made -majority voting, qualified voting, etc. -becomes key in this regard. Another possibility is that a firm is owned by a single agent. A non-anonymous mechanism that singles out this agent by requiring him to deliver the desired utility profile is what we are prescribing, in this case. The non-anonymous nature of the mechanism stems from the use of one worker's identity as the owner of the firm to, through extreme punishment, induce the desired allocation.
However consistent with the underlying informational structure of the problem, the suggested implementation relies too heavily on the fact that whole distribution of earnings is generated by a single firm.
Information on Aggregate Payments
If we maintain the assumption of a true monopsony can we enlarge the set of implementable allocations from that of small firms randomly matched with workers but still using tax systems? I.e., let us enrich the set of instruments as compared to that offered by small firms by assuming that the firm faces an additional tax on its total payments,ˆθ
Clearly, we can assume that this tax is 0 if the payments are equal to C :=θ
In this case, we can use Lemma (1) to write the firm's problem as an isoperimetric problem. 14 There is β ∈ R for which the firm maximizeŝθ
Lettingχ := χ(1 − β) we write the firms's problem aŝθ
This problem above is identical to program P F when we replace χ byχ. Proposition 7, below, ensues. 
Proposition 7. If the planner's desired allocation
(v * (θ)) θ∈[θ,
Profit-dependent Taxes on Earnings
Back to our random matching assumption, consider the specific case in which each firm is matched with a single agent. If the planner can cross the information about each worker's earnings and the profits earned by the firm he works for, the planner can in practice recover all information about the output that the worker is producing.
Hence, a mechanism under which the allocation assigned to the worker depends not only on his earnings but also on the profits of the firm he works for may, for all purposes, condition on the output he produces. This type of mechanism would allow the implementation of any Mirrlees' (1971) allocation.
Of course, the dependence of earnings taxation on firms' profits blurs the traditional separation between a worker and a firm. Besides, perfect identification of output is only possible in the case of one worker for each firm. Still, at least from a theoretical perspective, the use of such mechanisms are likely to increase the set of implementable allocations.
Conclusion
In this paper we take a first step towards bringing the analysis of optimal tax policy under imperfect competition to the same footing as that under competitive markets. We address optimal tax policy in what is effectively a monopsonistic labor market using a mechanism design approach.
The main driving force of our results is the relative value placed by the planner on highly productive agents. Participation constraints force a firm with market power to provide enough utility for the lowest type it hires. For any type above, the only thing that constrains the firm is incentive compatibility. No direct value of increasing one's welfare is warranted.
If market power is not so extreme, the firm will have to worry about losing workers to competition and will most probably be bound by these constraints. Clear cut results as the one found for this polar case are unlikely to arise. Yet, we conjecture that the forces that we have uncovered here will still be important there.
A Mathematical Appendix
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. Let
and define for any absolutely continuous v ∈ AC[θ, θ] (with derivitvev),
We restrict our attention to functions v such that v(θ) ∈ v * (θ), u 2 -recall that
We would like to apply Theorem 16.2 and Exercise 16.8 from Clarke (2013) to guarantee that the problem admits a solution in the class of the absolutely continuous functions,
Under these restrictions, if we guarantee that (φ, χ) is concave when restricted to the domain [0, H] × U, it will also be concave when its domain is R 2 . Notice that the objective functions is trivially coercitive of degree 2 with respect tov (as it is uniformly bounded above).
It is also concave inv by assumption. The only assumption from Theorem 16.2 and Exercise 16.8 which does not apply is the one that requests that Λ (θ, v(θ),v(θ)) is continuous. Hence we show how to modify the proof of these Theorems to deal with this case. For that letΠ be the supremum of the profit function over AC [θ, θ] and take a sequence v n ∈ AC[θ, θ] such that
We may thus assume thatv n ∈ [0, H] almost everywhere (otherwise φ(v n (θ)) = −∞ in a set of positive measure and thus Π (v n ) = −∞). Therefore sincev n ∈ [0, H] a.e. we may apply Alouglu Theorem (Theorem 3.14 in Clarke (2013) ) to find a subsequence (again without relabelling) and a function (r (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] 
Also taking a sunsequence if necessary we may assume that the sequence v n (θ) is convergent and writev(θ) for its limit. Clearly we havev(θ) ∈ v * (θ), u(c * (θ)) . As in the proof of Theorem 16.2 in Clarke (2013) , notice that for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] the indicator function of each interval [θ,θ] , I [θ,θ] , lies in the dual of L 2 [θ, θ] and hence since (v n ) converges weakly to r we havê
Also following the proof of Theorem 16.2 in Clarke (2013) 
It is straightforward to check thatv(θ) is continuously differentiable and thaṫ v n (θ) = r (θ) a.e.
Finally notice that Λ is upper semicontinuous with respect to (v,v) . Hence Hypothesis 6.37 in Clarke (2013) applies and Theorem 6.38 in Clarke (2013) imply thatΠ
which shows thatv is a solution.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the optimal allocation (v * ) and a policy of excluding all types θ ∈ θ − ε,θ . Define θ ε ∈ θ − ε,θ througĥθ
The policy of exluding all types θ ∈ θ − ε,θ leads the firm to forgo a total of
in profits. Next, notice that the utility received by theθ−ε in the planner's solution satisfies v * (θ − ε) ≥ v * (θ) + εh * θ . Therefore the change above allows the firm to increase h uniformly for all types θ ∈ θ,θ − ε by at least εh * θ /(θ − ε). This increases profits by no less than εh
We have used the concavity of φ to obtain the lower bound above. Because this must be true for all ε > 0, we obtain the following necessary condition for χ(u * (θ)),
For the rest of the proof, just add −κ(u * (θ)) in both sides (B) and use, from Proposition 1, the fact that κ (u
Proof of Proposition 3. We will show that if the subsidy is
we can choose marginal tax schedules for a tax system which implements the planner's allocation. Let χ := max u∈U χ , and take a small
where h o (θ) is the candidate solution for the firm's program and where we used the fact that φ is concave to obtain the upper bound above. Since εh(θ+ε) θ < εh(θ) θ and using (23) we havȇ
Hence, the left hand side of (27) is less than φ
the left hand side of (27) is less than
Therefore a sufficient condition for no exclusion is that the lower bound for the gains (26) is strictly greater than the upper bound for the losses (28):
which holds by the construction of χ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Immediate from Lemmas 4 and 6.
C Lemmata
In all that follows it will be convenient to define
We start with the following lemma. θ,θ] solves the firm's problem, P F , then the Euler equation (8) holds a.e.
Proof. Since we are assuming that χ is
15 Consider a particular Lipschitz function (y (θ)) θ∈ [θ,θ] such that y (θ) = y θ = 0. Now, take a scalar λ and consider the functional
15 For two AC functions v 1 (θ) θ∈ [θ,θ] and v 2 (θ) θ∈ [θ,θ] with uniformly bounded derivatives v i (θ) (for i = 1, 2) we consider the metric
D Bunching
D.1 Problems with Bounded Constraint
Consider the program, P n ,
For any allocation, (u n (θ) , h n (θ)) θ∈Θ , let
Lemma 8. Problem P n admits a solution. Moreover, all its solutions are [a.e.] equal.
Proof. The assumption that v 0 ≥ 0 implies that the allocation given by u n (θ) = v 0 ∀θ and h n (θ) = 0 ∀θ is feasible ∀n. The existence of a solution then follows from Tonelli Theorem (Theorem 16.2 in Clarke (2013)).
16
To see why the solution must be unique, consider two candidate solutions, (u a n (θ) , h a n (θ)) θ∈Θ , and u
16 Theorem 16.2 does not assume thatḣ n (θ) ∈ n −1 , n . The changes required to handle this case are straightforward -see proof of Lemma 3. i Thus, from the strict concavity of the objective function we have
Because the u λ n (θ) , h λ n (θ) θ∈Θ is incentive compatible, it cannot be true that both (u a n (θ) , h a n (θ)) θ∈Θ , and u
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that there is ε > 0 such that
For η sufficiently small, the allocation
is also feasible and yields a payoff of at least V (u
. Moreover, this allocation leads to a utility profile v *
Notice that h * η (·) is bounded and decreasing. Therefore, for each m ∈ N there exists a decreasing and 
From (31), there exists m
Hence, we can take a subsequence of u as well as u * η (θ) , h * η (θ) θ∈Θ are uniformly bounded. φ and κ are continuous functions so we can apply Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem to conclude that
This immediately implies that there is m * * ≥ m * such thatθ
which implies that
θ∈Θ is feasible for the problem P n whenever n is large enough, this contradicts (30).
Lemma 10. There exists a subsequence of solutions, (u * n (θ) , h * n (θ)) θ∈Θ , which converges almost everywhere to the allocation (u
Proof. Since both mappings, u * n and h * n , are monotonic, Helly's Selection Theorem implies that we can find a subsequence which [a.e.] converges to the allocation
for all θ .
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From the right-continuity of the limit allocation, we have
where (θ k ) ↓ θ is a sequence of points of continuity of
Fix θ k and notice that since (u n (θ) , h n (θ)) θ∈Θ is implementable we have, for all n, u n (θ) − θh n (θ) ≥ u n (θ k ) − θh n (θ k ), which implies iii Next, notice that we havêθ
by the Lebesgue Dominated Theorem. From Lemma 9, u & (θ) , h & (θ) θ∈Θ is optimal, while from Lemma 8,
The following Lemma is a corollary from Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. For any ε > 0, there exists n 1 ∈ N such that n ≥ n 1 implies u * n (θ) ∈ u * θ − ε, u * θ + ε ∀θ and h * n (θ) ∈ h * θ − ε, h * θ + ε ∀θ.
For ε > 0 sufficiently small assume, without loss, that u * n (θ) ∈ u * θ − ε, u * (θ) + ε ∀θ and h * n (θ) ∈ h * θ − ε, h * (θ) + ε ∀θ (otherwise take the tail subsequence starting at n 1 ).
D.2 Characterizing the Sequences of Programs D.2.1 Problem P n
The planner's program, P n , has the following optimal-control formulation, H n = [φ(h n (θ)) − κ (v n (θ) + θh n (θ))] f (θ) + γ n (θ) Φ n (θ) − v n (θ)f (θ) + λ n (θ) ḣ n (θ) + x n (θ) + µ n (θ) [v n (θ) + h n (θ)] + α n (θ) x n (θ) − n −1 + α n (θ) [n − x n (θ)]
The state variables are h n ,v n and Φ n , while the control variable is x n . In this problem, x n is restricted to lie in [n −1 , n]. We have the following boundary conditions, (i) h n (θ) and h n θ free.
(ii) v n (θ) and v n θ free.
(iii)Φ n (θ) = 0 andΦ n (θ) = v 0 .
The optimality conditions are, in this case, λ n (θ) + α n (θ) − α n (θ) = 0,
−λ n (θ) = [φ (h n (θ)) − θκ (v n (θ) + θh n (θ))] f (θ) + µ n (θ) ,
−μ n (θ) = −κ (v n (θ) + θh n (θ)) f (θ) − γ n (θ) f (θ),
iv and −γ n (θ) = 0.
First, note from (36) that γ n is a constant. Next, integratingμ n (θ) in (35) we obtain µ n (θ) =ˆθ θ [κ (v n (a) + ah n (a)) − γ n ] f (a)da.
Using the fact that h n (θ) is free, we have from (35) γ n =ˆθ θ κ (v n (θ) + θh n (θ)) f (θ)dθ.
Using the expression for −λ n (θ), we have:
Since v n (θ) and v n θ are free, we have λ n (θ) = λ n θ = 0, thus, λ n (θ) = −´θ θλ n (a) da. In this case, λ n (θ) =ˆθ Moreover, notice that x n (θ) = n −1 ⇒ α n (θ) ≥ 0 ⇒ λ n (θ) ≤ 0, x n (θ) = n ⇒ α n ≥ 0 ⇒ λ n (θ) ≥ 0 and x n (θ) ∈ (n −1 , n) ⇒ λ n (θ) = 0. Now we analyze the firm's program.
D.2.2 Problem P F n
The firm's program, P F n , has the following optimal-control formulation,
The state variables are h n and v n , and the control variable is x n . In this problem, x n is restricted to lie in [n −1 , n]. Furthermore, we define χ n for the domain u * θ − ε, u * θ + ε . We may set χ n (u) = ∞ ∀u ∈ u * θ − ε, u * θ + ε c .
We have the following boundary conditions:
(i) h n (θ) and h n θ free;
(ii) v n (θ) free, and;
The following are the optimality conditions,
−λ F n (θ) = [φ (h n (θ)) − θχ n (v n (θ) + θh n (θ))] f (θ) + µ F n (θ) ,
and −μ F n (θ) = −χ n (v n (θ) + θh n (θ)) f (θ).
D.2.3 Connecting P F n with P n We will construct λ F n (θ) , µ F n (θ) , χ n (θ) , α F n (θ) ,ᾱ F n (θ) to guarantee that all necessary conditions of the firm's problem are satisfied when they are evaluated at (u * n (θ) , h * n (θ)). Moreover, we must pick χ n (·) in such a way that the firm's problem is concave. Once we have accomplished this, Theorem 24.1 in Clarke (2013) guarantees that (u * n (θ) , h * n (θ)) solves the firm's problem. Using the fact that v n (θ) is free, we define µ Next, define χ n (·) such that χ n (v * n (θ) + θh * n (θ)) = κ (v * n (θ) + θh * n (θ)). Define also α F n (θ) , α F n (θ) := (α n (θ) , α n (θ)) and λ F n (θ) := λ n (θ) = 0. We will construct χ n (·) in such a way thatλ F n (θ) =λ n (θ) ∀θ.
Given λ F n (θ) = λ n (θ), (40) this implies that λ n (θ) = λ n (θ) for all θ and, in particular, that λ 
